Lobbying at the local level: social assets in Russian firms by Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga
Lobbying at the local level: social assets in Russian firms 
 
 
 
Tuuli Juurikkala and Olga Lazareva1 
 
 
 
This version: February 9, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the planned economy firms were made responsible for providing their workers with 
social services, such as housing, day care and medical care. In the transforming Russia of the 
1990s, social assets were to be transferred from industrial enterprises to the public sector. The 
law on divestment provided little more than general principles. Thus, for a period of several 
years, property rights concerning a major part of social assets, most notably housing, were 
not properly defined, as transfer decisions were largely left to the local level players. 
Strikingly, the time when assets were divested varied considerably across firms. In this paper 
we utilize recent survey data from 404 medium and large industrial enterprises in 40 Russian 
regions and apply survival data analysis to explore the determinants of divestiture timing. Our 
results show that in municipalities with higher shares of own revenues in their budget and 
thus weaker fiscal incentives, firms used their social assets as leverage to extract budget 
assistance and other forms of preferential treatment from local authorities. We also find 
evidence that less competitive firms were using social assets to cushion themselves from 
product market competition. At the same time, we do not find any role for local labor market 
conditions in the divestment process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Of the reforms that Russia has undergone during the transition period, the 
municipalization of social assets has been perhaps undeservedly neglected in the past few 
years. By the end of the Soviet era some 40% of total housing stock was held by industrial 
enterprises. The situation was similar for day care, medical care, recreation facilities and 
other social assets.2 Despite formally belonging to the state, these assets were in fact operated 
by firms and in this sense were in firms’ ownership, de facto if not de jure.  
From the beginning of the 1990s, the Russian Federation government has been three-
tiered, with federal, regional and municipal layers. In principle, the social service provision is 
delegated to the local level. During the mass privatization of industrial enterprises (1991-
1994), the major part of social assets operated by enterprises should have been transferred to 
municipal ownership. The institution of municipal ownership itself was created at the same 
time. Federal legislation on the municipalization of social assets provided only general 
principles and much was left for local authorities to decide. Thus, for a period of several 
years, property rights concerning the major part of social assets, most notably housing, were 
not properly defined. Previous literature emphasizes the importance of property rights for 
economic development and growth (Libecap 1989, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
In this paper we use data from a recent survey of 404 medium and large Russian 
industrial enterprises to study the transfer of property rights on social assets from firms to 
municipalities. The data shows that there is much variation across firms in the timing of 
transfer to municipalities, which started already in 1991 and for some firms continued even 
into 2003 and beyond. According to the survey results, even within a single municipality, the 
timing of divestment can vary considerably. We exploit this variation to study the interaction 
of firms and government in a weak institutional environment. 
 The focus of our analysis is thus on the political economy of reform, in particular on 
the relations between firms and municipalities. Firms and local authorities are often involved 
in bilateral bargaining over the distribution of benefits such as budget subsidies and tax cuts, 
and especially so in the transition environment with poorly defined property rights (see e.g. 
Shleifer and Vishny 1994, Sonin 2003, Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2005). We argue 
that the timing of divestiture of social assets in part depends on the ability of firms to use the 
assets as leverage in bargaining with municipalities. This ability arises from the fact that 
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social assets are a financial burden to the municipality just as they are to the firm, since 
housing and utilities, and social services in general, were and still are heavily subsidized for 
Russian consumers 3.The municipality is obliged to either accept the assets and cover all the 
costs or to bear the risk that the firm will underfinance the assets or abandon them altogether, 
which would have grave social and political consequences at the local level. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in return for holding social assets longer, firms have 
received various kinds of state budget support ranging from restructuring of tax arrears to 
direct subsidies to favorable prices on inputs or purchases. Indeed, our data shows that firms 
which still held housing after 2000 were receiving more in terms of budget assistance, were 
more likely to have tax arrears, and were more involved in trade with the public sector 
(presumably on favorable terms). Although there are examples of firms and municipalities 
achieving formal agreements on the use and joint financing of social assets, a significant 
share of these issues has been governed by informal relations. 
In our analysis we also draw on the recent literature on fiscal incentives at regional 
and municipal levels of government. Zhuravskaya (2000) has shown that the fiscal incentives 
of municipalities in Russia were quite weak during the 1990s, which had an adverse effect on 
public service provision and the development of local businesses. Further, Makrushin et al. 
(2003) have shown that weaker fiscal incentives are found in larger and richer municipalities 
which are able to collect more own incomes, as any additional income they collect is taxed 
away by regional governments in the form of reduced transfers. Consequently, such 
municipalities have no interest in developing their tax base. Instead, they may allow large 
local firms to divert taxes from upper level budgets in return for certain benefits (Sonin 
2003), in our case - upkeep of social assets. 
Our results corroborate these previous findings. In municipalities with higher shares 
of own budget revenues (mostly larger cities) firms divested their housing assets later. 
Moreover, within these municipalities, firms having greater political power (ability to 
influence laws and regulations) were also holding on to housing for a longer time and thus 
extracting more benefits. We also find that firms facing more competition in product markets 
divested later, which may indicate that social assets are used by uncompetitive firms to lobby 
for protection by the authorities. Thus the presence of social assets, for some firms, turned out 
to be a special kind of soft budget constraint that should have a negative effect on their 
performance and restructuring. 
                                                
3 E.g. for housing and communal services the federal standard for the percentage of costs covered by users was 
90% in 2003, while the actual average rate was around 60%, with substantial variation across regions. 
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In the following, we first describe in general the social asset divestment process in 
Russia and touch briefly on the current state of social service provision as revealed by survey 
results. We then take up the theoretical basis for our analysis and the hypotheses to be tested. 
The empirical section includes a description of the data and methodology, and a discussion of 
our findings. We show that firms that held on to housing did receive benefits from the public 
sector. We then move on to study the variation in divestment timing: which types of firms 
and in which localities were better able to exploit the advantage of having assets. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Social asset divestment in the 1990s 4 
 
2.1 Divestment process in the literature 
 
 According to Leksin and Shvetsov (1998, 1999), in 1992 not more than a third of the 
total housing stock in Russia was privately owned (mostly individual houses). The rest was 
considered public housing and included municipal housing and departmental 
(vedomstvennoe) housing that existed within branch ministries and was managed by 
enterprises. In 1994, a third of the firms with fewer than 500 employees provided housing 
while all enterprises with more than 10 000 employees did so. In the beginning of the 1990s, 
some 70% of large and medium-sized enterprises offered medical services while over 75% of 
large and 50% of medium-sized enterprises provided day care.  
In fact, by the start of the transition period, the social infrastructure within firms had 
already long ago become semi-municipal (Leksin and Shvetsov, 1998). Up to 50% of those 
who used these social services were not employees of the enterprise in question. Thus firms 
financed the municipal social infrastructure. 
Basic legal documents requiring divestiture of housing and the bulk of social assets 
within six months after the enterprise was privatized were adopted in 1992-19935. A 
gradualist approach was taken in the sense that, instead of immediate privatization, the assets 
were to be divested to local authorities, which were made responsible for the provision of the 
services. It is important to note that the social assets within firms were never legally in these 
firms’ ownership: at the time of mass privatization in the early 1990s, they were in federal 
                                                
4 Most of this section is based on Haaparanta et al. (2003). 
5 See Appendix 1 for the legal basis of the transfer of social assets from firms to municipalities 
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state ownership and were to be transferred to municipal ownership. Local authorities had 
considerable discretion over the organization of the divestiture process. 
The transfer of social assets was supposed to be completed by the end of 1997 and 
indeed the majority of assets were transferred by then (Leksin and Shvetsov 1998, 
Commander and Schankerman 1997). Roughly 80% of the housing stock, medical services, 
day care, sports facilities and children’s summer camps, as well as 60 -70% of recreation 
facilities became municipalized during 1993-1997.  
Starodubrovskaya (2002) accredits the perceived success in asset transfer to a large 
extent to the 1.5% local turnover tax introduced in 1995-1996 to finance housing and social 
facilities. As long as enterprises continued to hold the social assets, they could deduct their 
social expenditures from this tax. Before its abolishment in the 2000 tax reform, the turnover 
tax provided a mechanism allowing municipalities to receive additional funding after transfer 
with no mediation by regional or federal governments, and was actually the “only serious 
local tax in the Russian tax system”. After the tax reform, federal subsidies remained the only 
source of financial compensation for housing that was approved for municipal ownership. 
Municipalities could also make formal agreements with firms for joint financing of 
transferred assets. 
Importantly, the pace of divestiture of housing varied considerably in different 
locations - the share of municipalized assets could be between 15% and 100%. 
Starodubrovskaya (2001, 2002) argues that this was a result of complex relationships and 
incentive structures between the main players- enterprise management, local and regional 
governments, trade unions (in some cases), and different segments of the population. 
 
2.2 Social Assets in Firms - Survey Results 
 
Of the 404 firms that were surveyed 6, over 90% report having at least some kind of 
social assets in 1990, and over 90% still provided or supported at least one service in 2003, 
though the scale of firms’ participation in social service provision has diminished 
significantly during the last decade (see Table 1). In general, there has been a switch from 
holding assets to other forms of support, such as direct subsidies to employees. Larger firms 
in terms of employees are more likely to still be holding social assets and bear higher costs 
                                                
6 See data description in Appendix 2 
 6
relative to wage bill. Moreover, general managers of larger firms are less eager to divest their 
current social assets than managers of firms with fewer than 500 employees. 
In 1990, almost 80% of the 404 surveyed firms provided housing to their employees. 
Of those that did, nearly 60% have subsequently fully divested and almost all have divested 
either fully or partially.7 In most cases, divested assets went to the municipality, but for more 
than 20% of the firms that held housing in 1990 at least some apartments have been sold to 
other parties. In the spring of 2003, over half of the surveyed social managers reported that 
their respective firms still owned housing or provided housing support in some other form, 
mostly through direct subsidies. It is also striking that for over half of the firms offering this 
benefit, the occupants are not only employees and their families. This is a result of the 
peculiar functioning of the Soviet housing “market”, where people could not buy or sell 
apartments but could exchange them. 
Similarly to housing, close to 80% of firms provided medical care in 1990. However, 
only slightly more than 20% had ceased to provide it fully, and over 90% continue to support 
medical services in some form in 2003. Two-thirds of all surveyed companies still own these 
assets, mostly by having a so-called medpunkt on site8. 
Approximately 90% of the firms report having divested day care service, fully or 
partially. The transfer was almost always to the municipality. About 90% report full 
divestiture of day care, compared to 60% for housing. This service thus lost its relative 
importance in the social benefit package that firms offer their employees, in part because of 
demographic changes and a lower demand for the service. 
In line with previous studies, our data indicate that both the speed and scope of 
divestiture differ by asset type and locality. The majority of day care facilities were divested 
in the middle of the 1990s, while housing divestment has continued quite actively to the 
present time. Figure 1 shows the annual number of firms that carried out their last divestment 
of assets between 1990 and 20039. Only a few firms have divested medical facilities in 
general. The average firm in the sample had by 2003 divested 75% of its housing and 86% of 
its day care capacity. 10 
                                                
7 Full divestment includes firms that closed down operations, even if they did not actively divest related assets, 
e.g. buildings 
8 A Medpunkt is an on-site medical service, often simply a room in an administrative building. This partially 
explains the low figures on active divestment of medical assets. 
9 The firm may have divested before this year and may still have some assets left (though the majority was 
divested) but it did not divest after this date. 
10 Slower divestment of housing relative to day care may also be due to the fact that the share of expenses 
covered by user fees is typically higher for housing than for day care. 
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When asked about the main reasons for the divestments that took place during the last 
three years, a clear majority of the general managers said that the assets were an excessive 
burden on the firm. Of the firms that provided certain services in 2003, less than 5% of the 
general managers per asset deemed them profitable. As Table 1 shows, the majority of firms 
that still held housing in 2003 wanted to divest it, and approximately a half of those few that 
still provided day care wanted to divest that as well. Only a handful had the opportunity to 
sell the assets profitably, whereas many – about a third for housing, medical care, and day 
care - had been waiting for the municipality to finally accept the assets. Many managers still 
think their relations with municipalities would worsen should the firm sell the assets. More 
than a third of those who would like to divest their housing and day care faced legal or 
administrative barriers to selling them in the market, as they did not legally own them.  
In the following empirical analysis we focus on the divestment of housing There are 
three reasons for this: first, housing divestment timing shows the largest variation between 
firms; second, housing is the most burdensome of the social assets – in 2003 maintenance 
costs of housing stock were by far the largest item of firms’ social service expenditures; third, 
housing is arguably more important for the local community from a social point of view than 
are other types of assets, making it a powerful bargaining tool. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
 
We next formulate predictions about the determinants of social asset divestment 
timing. We focus on the decision of the firm to divest or to keep social assets for which 
property rights are not properly defined. Poorly defined property rights create possibilities for 
bargaining over benefits for both firms and local authorities, which may result in suboptimal 
allocation of resources (see Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
 
3.1 Special treatment of firms by the public sector.  
 
Of course, keeping social assets comes with a cost for the firms. Why would firms 
then agree to keep social assets? One reason is that they can extract rents from the 
municipality in exchange for providing services. Rents may come in the form of tax 
reductions, tax arrears, budget subsidies, better access to supplies, selling at non-market 
prices, and other preferential treatments. We thus hypothesize that firms that hold on to social 
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assets longer receive more budget assistance and have in general closer ties to the public 
sector than those that have already divested them.  
Why would a municipality want firms to provide social services, i.e. to postpone 
divestment? Obviously, this is a way to shift costs of providing services to the firms. It is also 
an instrument for diverting tax revenues from upper-level budgets when municipalities' fiscal 
incentives are weak (incentives of local authorities are modeled elsewhere; see Shleifer and 
Treisman 2000, Zhuravskaya 2000, Sonin 2003, and Haaparanta and Juurikkala 2004).  
As shown by Makrushin et al (2003), it is usually the larger and richer municipalities 
that have weaker fiscal incentives, as any additional budget income they collect can be 
expropriated by regional government through cuts in subsidies or shared taxes. Since most of 
income of municipalities comes from firms, not from individuals11, this gives rise to special-
interest-group politics. Municipalities are not interested in collecting more taxes from the 
firms; instead they collude with firms to give them tax reductions or other forms of assistance 
in return for certain benefits, in this case – upkeep of social assets.   
Also Sonin (2003) argues that in regions with high shares of productive enterprises, 
i.e. extensive own tax bases, the governor of the region can protect enterprises from federal 
taxes in return for bribes or other concessions from the firms. The same logic is applicable to 
the local level. Our expectation would thus be that in municipalities with higher shares of 
own budget revenues, firms hold social assets longer. Or, more generally, in municipalities 
where fiscal incentives are weak and hence there are incentives for rent extraction, the firms 
bargain for holding the assets longer.  
Finally, the interaction of firm with municipality over social assets depends largely on 
the firm's bargaining power, which is manifested in its ability to capture the state, i.e. 
influence the public decision-making (Slinko et al. 2005). The firm's bargaining power can be 
used in two opposing ways: to push for faster transfer of assets or to extract rents in return for 
keeping assets longer. We test also for the effects on divestment timing of other possible 
sources of bargaining power, such as a dominant position in the local labor market or being a 
major tax payer in the community. 
 
 
 
                                                
11 For example, of the major local taxes, the property tax is collected both from firms and individuals. However, 
the share of property tax coming from firms is on average around 10% of local tax income and may run as high 
as 85%, while individual property taxes constitute less than 1% of incomes. 
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3.2 Labor and product market pressure  
 
Another reason for a firm to hold on to assets is the benefits it can obtain by providing 
some of its employees’ compensation as social services. This may help to reduce the wage 
bill, attach workers (see Friebel and Guriev 2005, Grosfeld et al 2001) and/or attract new 
workers in a tight labor market. The size of this benefit for a firm will depend on the quality 
of its assets, e.g. on whether they are old or new, the costs of running the assets, the share of 
outside users of the assets, and the availability otherwise of social services in the locality. We 
test whether concentration in the local labor market and tightness of the labor market 
postpone divestment. 
 As the main object of our analysis is the firm and its incentives, we also want to 
investigate how product market competition enters into the picture. Do competitive forces 
make firms get rid of assets faster? Faced with strong competitive pressure, firms may try to 
reduce their non-productive costs via faster divesting of assets. On the other hand, if the 
potential for rent extraction is large, firms facing tough competition may try to cushion 
themselves from competition by keeping assets and extracting budget assistance or other 
forms of protection in return. 
 
4. Evidence on divestment timing  
 
4.1 Data and methodology 
 
In this section we analyze the determinants of social asset divestment timing using 
survey data from 404 medium and large industrial enterprises in 40 regions of Russia 
collected in 2003. We also utilize Goskomstat enterprise registry data as well as selected 
information on the municipalities in which the firms are located.12 Whenever municipal level 
data is used, Moscow and St Petersburg are excluded. Municipal data does not exist for them 
and they are in general very special cases. Most of the analysis deals with housing, as it is by 
far the largest and most important social asset which firms were obliged to transfer. 
In analyzing the determinants of divestiture timing, we use a survival data approach 
(see Lancaster 1990), alternatively called duration analysis. Survival analysis is used for 
analyzing the run-up time to an event. It models the risk of a change in the state of an object. 
                                                
12 For data description see Appendix 2, for variable definitions Appendix 3 
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It is used e.g. in the analysis of unemployment duration and in medical research. The reason 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is not generally applicable in this kind of analysis is that it 
assumes normal distribution of residuals, which is in many cases unreasonable with respect to 
time. We want to determine how quickly an enterprise will transfer its housing to the 
municipality, or more precisely, what is the probability that this happens in the next time 
interval, in our case a year, given that the firm has held the housing (i.e. remained in its 
original state) thus far.  
Parametric models of survival analysis apply certain assumptions regarding the 
distribution of residuals. In contrast, semiparametric models do not make any assumptions 
about the distribution of event time, though they do parameterize the effects of regressors. 
Thus these models are more suitable for changing circumstances such as the economic and 
regulatory environment during transition.  
We utilize the Cox proportional hazards model, which is a semiparametric estimator. 
We thus do not make any parametric assumptions as to exactly how the pressure to transfer 
assets changes over time. This method also accounts for the censoring problem, i.e. the fact 
that some firms still held housing in 2003, and we do not know when the change is going to 
happen. 
At the core of survival analysis is the estimation of the hazard function, which 
measures the risk of (or the contemporaneous probability of) a change in the object's state: 
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where f(t) is the density and F (t) the cumulative distribution function of the time of event. 
The resulting coefficients of the explanatory variables are thus hazard ratios 
(exponentiated coefficients from the model), which measure the risk of divestment. For 
example, a coefficient or hazard ratio of 1.2 indicates that a one-unit change of the 
corresponding variable increases the risk of divestment by 20%, i.e. it leads to faster 
divestment. In general, a coefficient greater than unity means that the variable speeds up 
divestment, while a coefficient less than unity means that the variable delays divestment. 
 
4.2 Timing of divestment and preferential treatment 
 
In this section we set out to prove that firms have indeed received preferential 
treatment in return for holding on to social assets. Also anecdotal evidence in the Russian 
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media suggests that firms solve social problems of regional authorities and, in return, 
authorities do not collect taxes from them. In some cases the un-paid taxes may even have 
exceeded the value of firms' provisions for social purposes. Further, it has been argued in 
public that the most common way to "pay" firms for holding assets is preferential 
restructurings of tax arrears and that more than half of the firms involved are not formally 
eligible for them.  
In addition to the above claims, we found a 1998 decree by the mayor of the city of 
Izhevsk (the center of the Udmurt republic) stating that the city administration should suggest 
ways for “partial reimbursement of costs borne by industrial enterprises and other 
organizations in holding non-transferred housing via reductions in taxes on housing and 
profits and by writing off their arrears from the city budget”.  
We utilize our data to show that this is not an exceptional case. Table 2 presents 
regression results where the dependent variables include a dummy that indicates whether a 
firm was receiving budget assistance in any form (subsidized credits, tax benefits or direct 
subsidies) during 2000-2002, a dummy indicating whether the firm had tax arrears in 2002, 
and one for the share of the firm’s sales going to the state in 2002. As the table shows, firms 
that transferred their housing late were more likely to have tax arrears and to have sold a 
higher share of their products to the state. They were also more likely to receive direct 
subsidies but as a whole, the results for budget assistance are not significant. 13 
This evidence suggests that firms were holding on to social assets for a good reason: 
they were “reimbursed” through subsidies and other forms of preferential treatment. Still, 
some firms divested their assets early on - apparently not being able to obtain such benefits. 
In the next section we examine the firm and locality characteristics that define a firm's ability 
to extract benefits in return for upkeep of housing, as manifested in the timing of divestiture.  
 
4.3 Determinants of divestment of social assets  
 
To study the determinants of divestment timing we apply survival data analysis as 
described above. The dependant variable in the Cox regressions is the time, in years, from 
1989 to the year when the firm divested it housing for the last time. It takes values from 1 for 
firms that divested in 1990 to 14 for firms that divested in 2003 or still held housing at that 
                                                
13 Moreover, firms that still held housing in 2003 received more state budget assistance, in particular 
restructuring of tax arrears and direct subsidies, and were also trading more with the state. Service provision in 
2002- 2003 is analyzed in more detail by Juurikkala (2006) and Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006) 
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time. Coefficients in the regression in Table 3 are hazard ratios and should be interpreted as 
noted above in the methodology section.  
Whatever the benefits a firm receives for not divesting its housing, it still must bear 
some costs for the upkeep of the housing. The more housing the firm has, the higher these 
costs are. Alternatively, the amount of housing a firm had represents its threat point, at which 
the firm could at worst simply abandon its assets, as anecdotal evidence indeed suggests was 
possible. We find that the higher the firm's amount of housing per employee in 1990, the 
faster the firm divested it (see Table 3). Thus firms that inherited a lot of assets pushed for 
faster transfer in order to shift costs to municipalities. 
As discussed above, the willingness of local authorities to enter into bilateral 
bargaining with firms depends on municipalities' fiscal incentives. Makrushin et al. (2003) 
have shown that larger and richer municipalities, which are able to collect more own 
incomes, have weaker fiscal incentives, as any additional income they collect is taxed away 
by a higher level government. We thus proxy fiscal incentives by size of municipality and by 
share of own incomes in the local budget14. The share of own budget income is positively 
related to the timing of divestiture though the effect is insignificant (Table 3). Quite naturally, 
the bargaining power of the firm should also affect the bargaining outcome. We asked the 
firms directly whether they can influence the laws and regulations adopted at the local, 
regional or national level15. We then studied the interaction of this variable with the 
municipality's share of own budget income. As column 2 in Table 3 shows, ability to capture 
the state is not significant per se but the interaction term is positive and significant, indicating 
that in municipalities with higher own budget income politically influential firms were 
holding on to housing for a longer time. Also, poorer municipalities could have been more 
willing to accept housing, as they were more likely to receive additional support from a 
higher level government for covering the costs involved. 
Another proxy for fiscal incentives – population of municipality – has robust and 
significant effects. In larger municipalities, firms held assets for a longer time. This effect is 
visible even at the level of simple means:  in municipalities with less than 300,000 
inhabitants, the average time it took firms to divest their housing was 8.6 years, with a 
median of 8 years; in larger municipalities, the average transfer time was 10.2 years, with the 
median firm divesting its housing in 11 years (differences are statistically significant). 
                                                
14 Own budget income includes property and land taxes, sales tax, locally defined taxes and non-tax payments. 
15 Interestingly, these are not only huge firms. Though the average size of a firm in this group is larger, there are 
a number of firms with 100-500 employees that are able to influence the state. 
 13
Consequently, while in 1990 firms in larger municipalities were less likely to hold housing 
(bigger cities had a higher share of municipal housing), by 2003 this relationship had been 
reversed: firms in larger municipalities were more likely to hold housing.  
Thus we show that weak fiscal incentives of municipalities, coupled with firms' 
ability to influence authorities, lead to the bilateral bargaining outcome. An alternative sign 
of a firm’s bargaining power is its relative importance to the municipality, i.e. the role of the 
firm as a local employer or taxpayer.  We can measure this by the firm's share of total 
industrial employment in the municipality and by the share of the firm's taxes in the total 
municipal budget income. The problem with the latter measure is its possible endogeneity 
regarding the timing of divestiture, as opposed to municipal level variables, which we 
consider to be exogenous. We hypothesize that a firm that holds on to social assets longer 
may receive tax reductions in return, which in turn reduces the share of its tax payments in 
the local budget. We do find negative correlation between time of divestiture and the share of 
the firm’s taxes in the local budget, but the direction of causality is not clear.  
The share of the firm in local employment is less subject to this problem since, at least 
until the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, firms were reluctant to shed labor and the level of 
employment was quite stable. We include this variable in the specification in column 4 of 
Table 3 but do not find any significant effect. In general these measures of a firm’s 
importance to a locality are highly correlated with our proxies for weak fiscal incentives, in 
particular municipality size: the larger the municipality, the smaller the firm's share of 
employment and budget. That is why it is difficult to disentangle the effects of these factors 
from those of municipalities’ incentives. 
Apart from the temptation to use social assets for lobbying, firms in transition also 
face pressures to restructure. Do competitive forces in the product market make firms get rid 
of assets faster? We find that the firms which operated initially in less competitive markets 
(measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index in 1990) actually divested housing faster (Table 3, 
column 2) 16.  
This seemingly surprising result may have the following explanation: if the potential 
for rent extraction is great, firms facing tough competition will try to cushion themselves 
from competition by holding assets and extracting budget assistance in return. Indeed, the 
interaction term between product market concentration and municipality's own budget 
income indicates that in municipalities with high own budget income (high potential for rent 
                                                
16 As a robustness check we use another measure of industry level concentration – the share of the two largest 
firms in the industry. This measure gives the same results as HHI. 
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extraction) firms that face more competition hold housing for a longer time. It is thus the less 
competitive firms that use social assets to cushion themselves from competition by 
bargaining for budget assistance.  
We also want to differentiate our “relations with municipalities” story from the 
hypothesis that firms in transition use in-kind compensation, including social services 
provision, to attach their workers, particularly in highly concentrated local labor markets 
(Friebel and Guriev 2005, Grosfeld et al. 2001).  We do not find that the concentration in the 
local labor market per se or the tightness of the labor market (measured by estimated time 
needed to find new employees) has any effect on the timing of divestiture (Table 3, column 
5). The reason that we do not find any significant effect for the structure of the local labor 
market on the timing of transfer of housing may be that, during the 1990s, most apartments 
were privatized over to the people living in them17. Moreover, already before the reforms 
began, many apartments in enterprise housing were occupied by people other than employees 
of the enterprise in question. Thus housing inherited from the Soviet era may not have been 
an effective instrument for attaching employees18.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Industrial restructuring in Russia is clearly a complex issue. In this paper we do not 
limit our analysis to restructuring but take a political economy view of enterprises' divestment 
of social assets to municipalities over the last decade or so. We argue that under poorly 
defined property rights, it is bargaining between firms and local authorities over costs and 
benefits from service provision that drives the divestment process.  
The rents the firms and the municipalities may bargain over consist mainly of firms' 
profits and public sector budget flows, but also firms' survival and political support. 
Bargaining is aggravated by the fact that social assets present a financial burden to both firms 
and municipalities, due to the social service sector being heavily subsidized. Although there 
are examples of firms and municipalities concluding formal agreements over the use and joint 
                                                
17 Though the privatization law allowed privatization of both municipal and departmental housing, according to 
some evidence firms were reluctant to let their workers privatize apartments in buildings under their control. By 
the end of 1993, only 20% of these apartments were privatized, as opposed to close to 40% for municipal 
housing (see Stryk and Kosareva, 1994). 
18 In a companion paper by Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006) we find  that the structure of the local labor market 
does have an effect on the current provision of social services by firms, which includes not only assets owned 
by the firm but also other forms of provision, such as financial support to employees in obtaining these services. 
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financing of social assets, a significant part of these issues has been governed by informal 
relations.  
We utilize a recent survey of 404 firms in 40 regions to study the determinants of 
divestment timing decision and the effects it has had on firms' performance. Our results show 
that firms which divested assets later received more benefits from the local authorities, 
especially in places where there are more rents to extract (i.e. where municipalities' fiscal 
incentives are poorer, which usually is the case in larger and richer municipalities). We also 
find that the firms facing more competition in product markets divested later, which could 
indicate that social assets are used to lobby for authorities' protection from competition.  
Finally, poorly defined property rights may have an adverse effect on incentives to 
invest in social assets and hence on the quality of public service provision. There is ample 
anecdotal evidence of housing which was kept in a disastrous condition for years before firms 
actually divested it. Given the essence of both a competitive private sector and the quality of 
public services for sustainable development and growth, our findings indicate that attention 
should be paid to the institutional aspects when designing economic reforms. The importance 
of the institutional environment for implementation of reforms cannot be underestimated. Our 
story is not the only one in which much-needed reform was impeded by poor incentives for 
the institutions actually in charge of implementing the reform. 
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Figure 1 Number of firms reporting last divestment, yearly 
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Table 1 Social asset provision: information from firm survey 
 
Percent of total 404 firms that… Housing Medical 
care 
Day care Recreation 
Had in 1990 78.5 76.7 69.8 38.2 
     
Have in 2003 39.5 78.5 11.9 25.9 
Spent money on municipal assets 
in 2002 
11.6 15.4 16.6 5.7 
     
Of those who have:     
Deem it profitable 1.9 1.3 2.1 4.8 
Want to get rid of (sell or 
transfer) 
70.7 12.4 46.8 29.4 
Of those who want to get rid of:     
Local authorities would agree to 
accept 
42.7 35.9 63.6 40.0 
Have legal or admin. barriers to 
selling 
38.9 35.9 31.8 23.3 
 
 
Table 2 Timing of divestment and preferential treatment 
 
 Any budget 
assistance in 2000 - 
2002 
Tax arrears end of 
2002 
Sales to state in 
2002 
 Probit Probit OLS 
Log employment 2002 0.142 -0.356*** -1.397 
 (0.101) (0.132) (2.707) 
Housing transfer after 
1998 
0.159 0.401** 8.635** 
 (0.179) (0.199) (4.317) 
Ownership controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 227 188 161 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 3. Cox proportional hazard model for factors determining housing divestment timing 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log employment 1998 0.919 0.929 0.869 0.945 0.960 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.089) (0.075) (0.083) 
Hous1990_per_employee 1.002** 1.002* 1.002* 1.002** 1.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Own_budget_income_share1999 0.371 0.568 0.603  0.434 
 (0.225) (0.513) (0.430)  (0.301) 
State_capture 0.896 1.751 0.882 0.849 0.932 
 (0.121) (0.707) (0.128) (0.117) (0.132) 
HHI1990 2.590* 0.148 2.651* 2.889** 2.588** 
 (1.307) (0.231) (1.560) (1.461) (1.246) 
Own budget income*State capture  0.140*    
  (0.153)    
Own budget income*HHI1990  1.086**    
  (0.043)    
Empl_share1998   1.956   
   (0.940)   
Log municipal population    0.865***  
    (0.044)  
HHI_labor_market1992     1.220 
     (0.711) 
Tight labor market     1.017 
     (0.014) 
Observations 211 211 189 212 197 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; industry dummies included; hazard ratios instead of coefficients reported 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
Appendix 1. Legal Basis for Transfer of Social Assets to Municipalities 19 
 
In spite of the obvious importance of large scale transfer of social assets by 
enterprises to municipality ownership, there was never a federal law regulating this process. 
Instead, the reform was regulated by a series of legal acts, enactments, decrees etc at all 
levels of government.  Many important acts were introduced with delays, sometimes only 
several years after start of the actual process of transfer, when the most acute problems had 
surfaced. 
The formation of municipal ownership of social and infrastructure assets started 
before mass privatization in 1991-1992. Enactment by Higher Council of Russian Federation 
№ 3020-1 on December 27, 1991 established the division of state ownership into federal 
ownership, ownership of subjects of federation and municipal ownership. This act defined the 
categories of assets which should be transferred to municipal ownership irrespective of who 
owned them or had them on their balance sheets previously. They were: 
 
• housing and other buildings 
• enterprises servicing housing and other social assets 
• infrastructure objects, city transport etc 
 
Another Enactment by President № 114-RP on March 18, 1992 established the 
procedures for transfer of social and infrastructure assets, according to which the municipal 
level property committee compiled a list of objects to be included in municipal ownership, 
and a higher level government confirmed the list. 
As for the social assets held by enterprises, enterprises never owned them during the 
Soviet era, as all assets were state owned, but they kept assets on their balance sheets. With 
the start of mass privatization of enterprises, these assets should have been either privatized 
or transferred to municipalities. Presidential Decree № 8 on January 10, 1993 listed the 
objects which could be included in the privatized assets of the firm with the requirement of 
keeping their profile. These included social and cultural objects (health, education, culture 
and sports facilities), consumer services (laundry, hairdressers etc.). Decree also listed the 
assets that could not be privatized by firms: 
 
• Buildings occupied by trading, catering, consumer services 
establishments, organizations of social security for children, elderly and disabled 
• Daycare and summer children's facilities 
• Regional transport and electricity infrastructure 
• Medical facilities servicing population of city/region 
• Housing and related service facilities 
 
All these assets were defined to be under federal state ownership and should have 
been transferred to municipal ownership. Further, several legal acts of the State Property 
Committee were issued to clarify the procedures for transferring the assets listed above from 
firms to municipalities (again, municipalities were responsible for compiling the list of 
objects to be transferred to municipal ownership). The Decree and further acts also enabled 
agreements between municipality and firm on joint usage and financing of transferred assets. 
There were other provisions on means of financing transferred objects. The State 
Privatization Program introduced at the end of 1993 did not add anything new to previous 
                                                
19 Based on Leksin and Shvetsov (1999) 
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legal acts except that it set the time limit: the municipality was obliged to accept non-
privatized social assets during the six months following acceptance of the firm’s privatization 
plan. The adoption of a firm's privatization plan then in practice initiated the process of 
transfer of these assets to municipal ownership. Further problems and questions arising 
during the process of municipalization of social assets were solved through multiple minor 
acts issued by different government bodies at all levels of government and in some cases 
through the courts.   
 
 Appendix 2. Data Description20 
 
The results are based on a survey of 404 middle-sized and large manufacturing firms 
from 40 Russian regions in April-June 2003. In the survey we examined the extent of social 
service and infrastructure provision by the firms and the firms’ assessment of the quality of 
public infrastructure and regulatory environment. Background information on ownership, 
investment, performance, competition, and financing decisions of the firms was also 
gathered. 
The source of information for the population of firms is the enterprise registry 
maintained by Goskomstat (State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics). In the 
construction of our sample we concentrated on the industrial sector, and within it 
manufacturing firms for which energy production is not a regular line of business. We set a 
minimum size limit of 400 employees, as pilot interview rounds indicated that smaller firms 
are unlikely to provide infrastructure or social services. Constructed in such a way, our 
sample frame contained 3523 firms. Our sampling technique includes a combination of 
clustering by region and systematic sampling by size. In the firms in our final sample, the 
general manager and managers responsible for social and infrastructure affairs were 
interviewed face-to-face. Reporting of accounting information was left to the chief 
accountant. 
In our sample, compared to the population of Russian firms, the majority of industries 
are adequately represented in terms of share of firms, as are the federal districts. The fact that 
we surveyed medium and large enterprises explains the bias towards metallurgical firms 
regarding the distribution of industrial employment. The size distribution of our final sample 
is close to the population with the median establishment having 784 and average over 1600 
employees.  
Only 5 % of the firms in the sample are relatively new, created during the 1990s. The 
majority of firms in the sample are open joint stock companies, which is not surprising as 
most of the formerly state-owned firms were turned into open joint stock companies during 
the mass privatization of the early 1990s and some 80 % of the sampled firms were privatized 
during 1991-1994. Lastly, similar to many previous surveys, the sample contains some 
degree of selection bias towards the better-performing firms. 
In addition to the survey data, we use Goskomstat enterprise registry data on sales, 
profits, employment and capital to construct measures of industry-level concentration, labor 
market concentration, and firm performance measures.  We also use data on municipal 
budgets, and some municipal- and regional-level indicators. 
                                                
20 For details see Haaparanta et al (2003) 
 22
Appendix 3 Description of Variables 
 
Variable name Description 
  
Hous1990_per_employee Tens of square meters of housing the firm had 
in 1990 per employee 
  
Own_budget_income_share1999 Share of own revenues in total income of 
municipal budget in 1999 (takes values from 0 
to 1) 
  
State_capture Dummy equal to 1 if firm admits its ability to 
influence laws and regulations at local or 
regional level 
  
HHI1990 Herfihdahl-Hirschman index for 5 digit 
industries in 1990 
  
  
Empl_share1998 Share of firm’s employment in total industrial 
employment in municipality in 1998 (takes 
values from 0 to 1) 
  
HHI_labor_market1992 Herfihdahl-Hirschman index for local labor 
market in 1992 
  
 
 
